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Polycom and Mitel: The Merger That Never Tested My Argument

Revisiting the proposed Polycom and Mitel combination, what actually happened, and why a cancelled deal cannot prove an integration would have failed.

SIMON DUDLEY · · 8 MIN READ

Illustration accompanying Polycom and Mitel: The Merger That Never Tested My Argument

A new edition of the Simon Dudley archive, pairing an original article with a present-day follow-up.

Then: Does the proposed Polycom Mitel mashup make sense?

Originally published on LinkedIn on 2015-10-09. The historical text below is preserved as written, including its contemporary claims and author information.

At first blush a combined UC Telephony company and a UC Video Conferencing company makes sense. It looks great right up until you look under the covers then the shine comes off rather quickly.

Where are the Mitel Video clients today?

Mitel clients aren’t buying much video today. If they were then the relationship with Vidyo would be flourishing. If it is then I for one have seen scant evidence.

Simple as ABC

Polycom’s customers are often the ABC’s (Anything But Cisco) crowd. I see little evidence that Mitel lives in that world.

Different Clients

Polycom and Mitel sell to different types of buyers, solve very different business problems and have different competitors. Combining them would double their competitors, so for example the already very one sided relationship with Microsoft would quickly evaporate for Polycom. Long term no third party Hardware manufacturer has prospered in a relationship with Microsoft. This deal would simply speed up the process.

Boxes

Polycom are a product company, they love new Hardware. You can see the evidence of this with the new $70,000 product they launched this week. The problem is the market is moving directly away from high cost hardware, to lower cost more flexible solutions. Polycom is in desperate need of a Cloud strategy. Mitel has over the last few years built a great Cloud strategy and are right in the middle of executing this vital innovation. If they were to merge Polycom would have to rely heavily on the expertise of Mitel to get into the Cloud space. This would then slow down where the majority of the revenue would be which is of course in the Motel business. As a result of all this it would slow Mitel down. I can’t see how that would be a winning strategy right in the middle of the Excession Event that is the UC space at present.

How good is your M&A?

Both Mitel and Polycom need to bulk up to counter their huge competitors Avaya, Cisco and Microsoft. Mitel obviously understand that they have holes in their business and have built a great M&A machine to fix it. Just look at the number of companies Mitel as bought and integrated in the last few years. Polycom have always done a horrible job integrating new businesses. Think how the Viewstation and the SoundStation didn’t even work together after TEN YEARS !!!

Polycom were Switzerland

Increasingly Polycom are becoming an audio player. Their products are world class in that arena and the ability to sell their products to a range of UC suppliers would be heavily impacted if they were part of Mitel. They were Switzerland in the UC space. Not if they merge with Mitel.

The world’s best buggy whips

Polycom are the ultimate buggy whip manufacturers, but the world is moving to automobiles. Users are now looking for highly flexible, low cost, room solutions empowering their users to deploy any SW codec they like. Not 

It’s easier to sell a $100,000 product than a $10 product

There remains a market for $20k rooms, but as the market data shows that market is shrinking at 10% a year and has been for over 5 years. Huddle rooms with high end, low cost, PTZ webcams are the growing trend. Polycom doesn’t have a business model able to cope against the major player in that space, Logitech. The business model making money selling few products expensively is much easier than selling lots of low cost devices.

What could you do with 18 months?

18 months of disruption during the “merger” would be a huge headache. Management time would be wholly focused on internal issues not external ones. The Video Conferencing market in particular is in a time of huge change. An Excession Event no less. All the growth in the VC market is in Cloud offerings. A sector Polycom appears completely absent from. For Polycom who are already very late to the Cloud party to take 18 months off from making these changes would be catastrophic for them and their partners.

Oh you could save some money, for a while

There would be cost savings by combining the businesses but the culture, clients, workflow, sales and marketing models are all highly diverged.

Right dance, wrong partner

I agree strongly with Elliott Management that the market needs to consolidate, but I think this is the wrong pairing.

About the Author: Simon Dudley

I’m a contrarian. I make a habit of being the guy who questions the orthodoxy, the guy who doesn’t believe it just because the good and the great said it’s true. Even when it’s a bad idea I can’t help but speak up. This has not always been good for my career, but it’s generally been very good for my employers if they are prepared to listen.

My Book The End of Certainty "How to thrive when playing by the rules is a losing strategy" explains why groupthink and the doing what you’ve always done is no longer the right move.

To keep tabs on my work please follow me on: ExcessionEvent

View the original LinkedIn article

Now: the follow-up

In October 2015, I looked at the proposed combination of Polycom and Mitel and concluded that it was the wrong pairing.

The argument was fairly blunt. Different customers. Different commercial models. Different relationships with the companies that supplied the platforms. A substantial integration job at precisely the moment both businesses needed to pay attention to what was happening outside the building.

Reading it again, I still think those are sensible questions. I also think I owe the original a distinction that hindsight makes rather easy to overlook.

A deal that never happened cannot demonstrate how its integration would have worked.

What actually happened

My article was published on October 9, 2015. That matters because it preceded the definitive merger agreement announced on April 15, 2016. Mitel then proposed acquiring Polycom in a cash and stock transaction valued at approximately $1.96 billion. The original piece belongs to the earlier discussion about a possible combination, rather than reporting that signed agreement. [1]

On July 8, 2016, Polycom terminated the Mitel agreement and paid a $60 million termination fee. Mitel's filing records a competing offer and its decision to waive its matching rights. Polycom's filing identifies the alternative as the Siris transaction. [2][3]

The subsequent ownership story continued. Plantronics completed its acquisition of Polycom on July 2, 2018. HP completed its acquisition of Poly on August 29, 2022, describing the transaction as approximately $3.3 billion in enterprise value, including net debt. [4][5]

Those events establish a chronology. They do not constitute a laboratory experiment in which someone tested my 2015 argument and awarded it a gold star.

Cancellation is a different outcome from failed integration

There is a tempting version of this retrospective in which I say the merger did not happen, therefore I was right about the merger.

That would be convenient. It would also be nonsense.

The documents support a narrower explanation: a competing transaction displaced the Mitel agreement. They do not establish that the combined operation had been tried and found wanting. It never reached that stage.

My concerns about customer overlap, partner relationships and management distraction remain hypotheses about the proposed combination. Assessing them would require evidence about the businesses and their alternatives, rather than treating the termination itself as proof.

This is an awkward rule for anyone maintaining an archive of predictions. It considerably reduces the opportunities for retrospective self-congratulation. Probably a feature.

A product portfolio is the beginning of the discussion

The stronger part of the original was its insistence on examining how the businesses would fit together commercially.

A slide showing telephony beside conferencing can make the portfolio look complete. The people buying those products may have different budgets, different priorities and different reasons for choosing a supplier.

For a combination to create additional demand, someone still has to explain the buying occasion. Which customer needs both? Who makes the decision? How does the combined offer become easier to buy or use?

These are questions to investigate, rather than reasons automatically to reject an acquisition. Some combinations answer them very well. The portfolio diagram cannot answer them on its own.

Independence can have commercial value

I also argued that Polycom's position as a supplier across other companies' environments was worth protecting. I described it as Switzerland.

That metaphor can help frame a question, but it cannot settle the answer. Joining a larger business might create conflicts for existing partners. It might also provide distribution, investment or access that outweighs those conflicts.

The useful test is to identify the relationships involved and estimate what changes for each one. An acquisition announcement gives you a new owner. It does not, by itself, tell you how every customer and partner will respond.

My original language about hardware companies and Microsoft was too absolute. A serious comparison needs a defined period, a measure of success and evidence for the particular relationship. Sweeping claims save time largely by leaving the difficult work undone.

The integration bill includes attention

The original also worried about eighteen months of disruption. That was a scenario, not a measured integration duration for a transaction that had closed.

The broader issue is still worth examining. What engineering work gets postponed? Which customer commitments need attention? Who is responsible for retaining partners while management integrates the business?

Those questions should sit alongside projected cost savings. Otherwise a company can produce a beautifully quantified spreadsheet while leaving the most important assumptions in the footnotes.

Looking back, the useful lesson is to make the commercial case explicit and keep the claims testable. The subsequent acquisition chain provides history to study. It does not remove the uncertainty people faced in 2015.

When you assess an acquisition, what convinces you that the businesses fit together beyond the product slide?

Sources

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